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Arkansas v Oklahoma: Restoring the Notion
of Partnership Under the Clean Water Act
Katheryn Kim Friersont
The long history of interstate water pollution disputes traces
the steady rise of federal regulatory power in the area of environmental policy, culminating in the passage of the Clean Water Act
Amendments of 1972.1 Arkansas v Oklahoma2 is the third and
latest Supreme Court decision involving interstate water pollution since the passage of the 1972 amendments. By all accounts, Arkansas is wholly consistent with the Court's prior
decisions. In Milwaukee v Illinois3 and InternationalPaper Co. v
Ouellette,4 the Court held that the Clean Water Act ("CWA")
preempted all traditional common law and state law remedies.
Consequently, states lost much of their traditional authority to
direct water pollution policies. Despite the claim that the CWA
intended "a regulatory 'partnership' between the Federal Government and the source State", Milwaukee and InternationalPaper
placed states in a subordinate position to the federal governt B.A. 1994, Williams College; J.D. Candidate 1998, University of Chicago.
' Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub L No 92-500, 86
Stat 816, codified at 33 USC § 1251 et seq (1994) (commonly known as Clean Water Act;
Amendments of 1972). Comprehensive water pollution control by the federal government
began with the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948. Pub L No 80-845, 62 Stat
1155. Inadequacies of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948 and increasing
water pollution problems prompted Congress to enact the Water Quality Act of 1965. Pub
L No 89-234, 79 Stat 903. Continued dissatisfaction with the federal programs finally led
Congress to overhaul all past water pollution control programs and enact the Clean Water
Act Amendments of 1972. See Comment, Oklahoma v EPA. Does the Clean Water Act
Provide an Effective Remedy to Downstream States or Is There Room Left for Federal
Common Law?, 45 U Miami L Rev 1137, 1146-49 (1991).
Disputes regarding interstate waterways have been a source of intense controversy
since the founding of the Nation. See, for example, New York v New Jersey, 256 US 296
(1921); Missouri v Illinois, 200 US 496 (1906); Georgia v Tennessee Copper Co., 206 US
230 (1907); New Jersey v New York, 283 US 336 (1931); Illinois v Milwaukee, 406 US 9L
(1972); Ohio v Kentucky, 444 US 335 (1980); Milwaukee v Illinois, 451 US 304 (1981); In.
ternationalPaperCo. v Ouellette, 479 US 481 (1987).
2 503 US 91 (1992).
3 451 US 304 (1981).
479 US 481 (1987)
' Milwaukee, 451 US at 316-17 (preempting traditional common law remedies);
InternationalPaper, 479 US at 498-99 (preempting state law remedies).
6 InternationalPaper,479 US at 490.
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ment.7 Most commentaries conclude that Arkansas simply confirms the subordinate status of the states first established by
Milwaukee and InternationalPaper.8
On the contrary, Arkansas restores a balanced notion of
partnership between states and the federal government under
the CWA. The Arkansas Court found the preemption framework
inappropriate for adjudicating interstate water pollution disputes
arising under the CWA' Furthermore, the Court held that judicial review of the EPA's actions in resolving interstate disputes
should be governed by the standard of reasonable deference
announced in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v Natural Resources Defense
Council.10 Arkansas's departure from the traditional preemption
analysis, together with its holding under Chevron, helps restore
the sense of shared power between the states and the EPA
intended by the spirit of cooperative federalism embodied in the
CWA.1" Arkansas provides a framework in which states may
participate as equal partners with the federal government in
administering water pollution policy.
This Comment examines the way in which Arkansas recasts
the relationship between the states and the EPA under the CWA.
Part I provides the background for Arkansas by discussing relevant portions of the CWA and the ways in which prior decisions
interpreted the statute in interstate water pollution disputes.
Part II argues that Arkansas significantly restricts the scope of
past preemption cases. Part III explores Arkansas's application of
Chevron and concludes that Arkansas's Chevron holding is not

See InternationalPaper,479 US 481; Milwaukee, 451 US 304.
Note, Downstream States and Upstream Permits: Does Arkansas v. Oklahoma

Allow PotentialDownstream Control in the NPDES Process?, 16 Hamline L Rev 185, 197203 (1992) (suggesting that Arkansas, consistent with prior decisions, affirmed EPA's
broad discretionary authority in the interstate water pollution context); Note, The Impact
of Arkansas v. nlinois on the NPDES Process under the Clean Water Act, 23 Envir L 273,
274 (1993) (arguing that the Arkansas Court reaffirmed the holdings of prior interstate

water pollution cases that concluded CWA preempted state law); Neil Fairweather,
Arkansas v Oklahoma: Downstream States Left without a Paddle, 9 J Nat Resources &
Envir L 189, 190 (1993-94) (concluding that Arkansas continued trend towards minimiz-

ing state control); Comment, The States Square Off in Arkansas v. Oklahoma--and the
Winner Is... the EPA, 70 Deny U L Rev 557, 558-59 (1993) (concluding that Arkansas

perpetuated EPA domination of environmental policy); Note, The Ever-ChangingBalance
of Power in Interstate Water Pollution: Do Affected States Have Anything to Say after Arkansas v Oklahoma?, 50 Wash & Lee L Rev 1341, 1343 (1993) (arguing that, after Arkansas, affected states have little role to play in interstate water pollution conflicts).

503 US at 106.
Id at 110, citing Chevron, 467 US 837 (1984).
"
See Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism:HistoricalRoots and Contemporary Models, 54 Md L Rev 1141, 1174-75 (1995).
"
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equivalent to the traditional preemption analysis in subordinating the states. Finally, Part IV illustrates the important differences between the implications of Arkansas's Chevron analysis
and the traditional preemption analysis, and concludes that
Arkansas provides room for the restoration of the cooperative
federalism central to the CWA's original framework.
I. BACKGROUND
The CWA, by setting effluent limitations and water quality
standards, and by overseeing water pollution permit programs,
seeks to restore and maintain the integrity of the Nation's waters. State participation and cooperation are crucial to achieving
that goal. Early case law interpreting the scope of the CWA concluded that the provision fully preempted all traditional common.
law and state law remedies for interstate water pollution. Under
the CWA, the EPA applies federal law in resolving interstate
water pollution disputes.
A. The Structure of the Clean Water Act
Initially, Congress refrained from regulating water pollution
because it viewed the subject as one traditionally reserved to the
authority of the states.12 In the absence of federal law, states
and citizens sought relief from interstate water pollution under
both federal and state common law theories of nuisance."
Over the years, Congress reconsidered its stance toward
water pollution in the face of deteriorating environmental condi.tions and continued conflict between states. 4 In 1972, Congress
passed the Clean Water Act Amendments of 1972, the most com.prehensive water pollution measure to date."

12 For a comprehensive history of water pollution legislation and adjudications prior
to the CWA, see Comment, Oklahoma v EPA: Does The Clean Water Act Provide an
Effective Remedy To Downstream States or Is There Still Room Left for Federal Common
Law?, 45 U Miami L Rev 1137, 1142-48 (1991).
"3 See New Jersey v New York City, 283 US 473 (1931) (state common law theory);
New York v New Jersey, 256 US 296 (1921) (same); Georgia v Tennessee Copper Co., 237
US 474 (1914) (same); Missouri v Illinois, 200 US 496 (1906) (same); Illinois v Milwaukee,
406 US 91 (1972) (federal law theory).
14 Comment, 45 U Miami L Rev at 1146-48 (cited in note 12).
Pub L No 92-500, 86 Stat 816, codified at 33 USC § 1251 et seq (1994); Milwaukee,
451 US at 317-18 (1981) (citing legislative history calling the CWA "the most comprehensive and far reaching water pollution bill.., ever drafted").
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The Amendments sought to "restore and maintain the chemi16
cal, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."
The law established three mechanisms to achieve this overall
objective: effluent limitations, 17 water quality standards, 8 and
a national pollution permit program."
Effluent limitations, promulgated by the EPA, establish the
"quantities, rates, and concentrations of chemical, physical, biological, and other constituents"2 ° tolerated in any point-source
discharge. 2' Water quality standards supplement the effluent
limitations.22 They set forth the criteria for maintaining a desired standard of water quality for an entire body of water in
order that "'numerous point sources, despite individual compliance with effluent limitations, may be further regulated to prevent water quality from falling below acceptable levels." 3 Water
quality standards are generally the responsibility of the states,
which set their own standards for waters within their boundaries, subject to approval by the EPA.24
The CWA also provides for the enforcement of both effluent
limitations and water quality standards through a permit program called the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
("NPDES"). 2 Under the NPDES program, parties wishing to
discharge pollutants into U.S. waters must obtain a permit.2"
The permit requires compliance with the effluent limitations and
water quality standards of the state in which the discharges take
place.27
As an alternative to the federal NPDES permit system, the
CWA authorizes individual states to establish and enforce their
own permit programs." The states may set individual effluent

is 86 Stat at 816, codified at 33 USC § 1251(a).
17 Id at 844-46, codified at 33 USC § 1311.
Id at 846-50, codified at 33 USC § 1313.
Id at 880-83, codified at 33 USC § 1342.
20 33 USC § 1362(11).
21 33 USC § 1311.
33 USC § 1313.
2 EPA v California Water Resources Control Board, 426 US 200, 205 n 12 (1976)
(referring to 33 USC § 1313).
33 USC §§ 1313(a),(b).
33 USC § 1342.
33 USC §§ 1311(a), 1342(a)(1).
33 USC § 1342(aX2).
28 See 33 USC § 1342(a),(b). The CWA also includes a citizen suit provision that
authorizes citizens to bring an enforcement action against any person who is alleged to be
in violation of a CWA effluent limitation or water quality standard. Id at § 1365. The citizen suit provision adds a third leg to CWA's enforcement structure. See David R. Hodas,
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limitations and water quality standards as long as they are consistent with federal requirements." Furthermore, the CWA,

through a provision commonly called the Savings Clause, 0 explicitly reserves to the states the right to enforce effluent limitations or water quality standards that are more stringent than the
national limitations or standards.3 1
In states that decline to institute their own program, the
EPA administers a federal permit program.3 2 Although an EPA
permit program must satisfy the "same terms, conditions, and
requirements" as state permit programs,3 the EPA has interpreted the CWA broadly, requiring permits that it issues to comply with all "applicable water quality requirements,"' including
the water
quality standards of other states affected by the dis35

charge.

B. The Clean Water Act Preempts Federal and State Common

Law Remedies
After passage of the 1972 Aanendments the Court revisited a
question it had previously left unanswered: does the CWA preempt traditional federal common law remedies that govern interstate water pollution disputes?" In Milwaukee v Illinois,7 the

Court answered in the affirmative, explaining that Congress fully

Enforcement of Environmental Law in a TriangularFederal System: Can Three Not Be a
Crowd When Enforcement Authority is Shared by the United States, the States, and Their
Citizens?, 54 Md L Rev 1552 (1995).
33 USC § 1342(b).
33 USC § 1370.
31 The Savings Clause provides in relevant part:
Except as expressly provided in this [Act], nothing in this [Act] shall (1) preclude or deny the right of any State or political subdivision thereof or interstate
agency to adopt or enforce (A) any standard or limitation respecting discharges
of pollutants, or (B) any requirement respecting control or abatement of pollution [with exceptions]; or (2) be construed as impairing or in any manner affecting any right or jurisdiction of the States with respect to the waters (including
boundary waters) of such States.
Id.
32 33 USC § 1342(a).
33 USC § 1342(aX3).
3' 33 USC § 1341(b).
Arkansas, 503 US at 103.
In 1972, just months before the passage of the 1972 Amendments, the Court held
in Illinois v Milwaukee, 406 US 91 (1972), that federal common law continued to govern
interstate water pollution disputes. Id at 107. Justice Douglas warned, however, that
pending federal legislation will likely preclude such federal common law remedies in the
future. Id.
17 451 US 304 (1981).
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"occupied the field through the establishment of a comprehensive
regulatory program supervised by an expert administrative agency," leaving no room for courts to formulate federal standards
through the use of common law principles."5
On its face, Milwaukee displaced only federal common law

and did not address the issue of whether the CWA also preempts
state law. Indeed, the Court took pains to point out that the
standard for the preemption of state law was higher than that for
the preemption of federal common law, and the holding addressed only the former.3 9 Nevertheless, the Milwaukee Court

suggests in dicta that the CWA may satisfy the higher threshold
for the preemption of state law as well. The Court made much of

the "comprehensive" nature of the CWA40 and stated that a
state can seek relief from interstate water pollution only by following1 the procedural safeguards afforded by the permit process.

4

The Court in InternationalPaper Co. v Ouellette4 2 explicitly

confirmed the intuition of the Milwaukee Court that the CWA
preempted state law. In International Paper, a citizen's group
comprised of homeowners on the Vermont shores of Lake Cham-

plain brought a state nuisance action against the International

Id at 316-17.
Id. A federal statute preempts state law if. 1) Congress defines explicitly the extent
to which its enactments preempt state law; 2) federal law regulates conduct in a field that
Congress intended the federal government to occupy exclusively; or 3) state law conflicts
with federal law and "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress." English v GeneralElectric Co., 496 US 72, 78-79
(1990).
In assessing whether a federal statute preempts state law the courts begin with the
assumption that the "'historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by
the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.- Milwaukee,
451 US at 316-17, quoting Jones v Rath Ranching Co., 430 US 519, 525 (1977), quoting
Rice v Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 US 218, 230 (1947). When, on the other hand, the
question is whether federal common law is preempted, the initial presumption is that "it
is for Congress, not federal courts, to articulate the appropriate standards to be applied as
a matter of federal law." Id at 317.
40
451 US at 317-19.
" Id at 326. "The statutory scheme established by Congress provides a forum for the
pursuit of [interstate water pollution] claims before expert agencies by means of the
permit-granting process." Id. Procedural safeguards include notification by permit-granting authority of states affected by the permit and opportunity for the affected states to
participate in a public hearing. 33 USC § 1342(bX3).
42 479 US 481 (1987). For a discussion of the preemption doctrine applied in International Paper and criticisms of the Court's application, see Ann M. Lininger, Narrowing the
Preemptive Scope of the Clean Water Act as a Means of EnhancingEnvironmental Protection, 20 Harv Envir L Rev 165 (1996).
"
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Paper Company ("IP"). 4 IP operated a plant on the New York
shores of Lake Champlain and the group claimed that the discharge of effluents from the plant into the lake constituted a
continuing nuisance under Vermont law." Relying on the Savings Clause, the plaintiffs argued that the CWA, far from preempting the applicability of state law remedies, explicitly preserved them. 45 Therefore, they reasoned, the discharge of pollutants in one state that injured parties in another state should be actionable under the laws of the affected state."
The Court disagreed and held that the CWA preempted the
application of the affected state's law in the interstate context.47
The Court, echoing the language of Milwaukee, found the CWA
"sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the inference
that Congress 'left no room' for supplementary state regulation."' In other words, the comprehensiveness of the CWA met
the standard for preemption of state law.49
II. ARKANSAS V OKLAHOMA LIMITS THE IMPLICATION OF PAST
INTERSTATE WATER POLLUTION CASES

Arkansas v Oklahoma0 is the third interstate water pollution dispute to come before the Supreme Court since the passage
of the CWA. The Court held that despite Milwaukee v Illinois
and InternationalPaper Co. v Ouellette, the CWA did not prohibit
the EPA from conditioning a discharge permit for a facility in one
state on compliance with the state water quality standard of a
downstream state.5 ' The Court also held that the EPA's interpretation of a state's water quality standard ought to receive
deference from reviewing courts.52
Arkansas significantly limits the implication of past interstate water pollution decisions. Although the preemption doctrine
in Milwaukee and InternationalPaper could have easily resolved
the dispute in Arkansas, the Court chose not to expand the doc-

13 479

US at 484.
Id at 483-84.
Id at 485.
Id.

4 479 US at 498-99.

Id at 491, quoting Hillsborough County v Automated Medical Laboratories,Inc.,
471 US 707, 713 (1985).
'9
Id at 494-97. See note 37.
o 503 US 91 (1992)
5' Id at 106-07.
Id at 110.
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trine to cover instances where one state's water quality standard
conflicted with that of another state.
A. Arkansas v Oklahoma
In 1985, the city of Fayetteville, Arkansas sought an NPDES
permit for the city's new sewage treatment plant.5" In the absence of a state NPDES program, the EPA was the permit-issuing agency in Arkansas. 4 The EPA granted the Fayetteville facility a permit authorizing it to discharge its effluents into a
tributary of the Illinois River that flowed out of Arkansas into Oklaho55
ma.
Oklahoma objected to the permit on grounds that the discharges would violate Oklahoma's water quality standard adopted pursuant to the CWA.5" In pertinent part, Oklahoma's water
quality standard provided that "'no degradation [of water quality]
shall be allowed' in the upper Illinois River, including the portion
of the river immediately downstream from the state line."57 In
an administrative proceeding, the EPA's Chief Judicial Officer
ruled that the CWA "requires an NPDES permit to impose any
effluent limitations necessary to comply with applicable state
water quality standards,'" including the water quality standards
of a downstream state such as Oklahoma. However, the judge
held that the Fayetteville permit should be upheld if evidence
shows no "'actual detectable violation'" of Oklahoma's standards.5 9 The phrase "no degradation" was interpreted to mean
"no detectable violation." Finding no detectable violation of the
Oklahoma standard on the evidence, the judge upheld the
Fayetteville permit.'
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit overturned the Agency's ruling,
relying upon a novel theory not advanced by any party to the
case. 1 Finding that the portion of the Illinois River subject to
the Oklahoma "no degradation" standard was already in violation

3 Id at 95.
503 US at 95.
Id.
Id.
'7 Id, quoting 82 Okla Stat Ann § 1452(bXl) (West Supp 1989).
Id at 96-97, quoting Opinion of EPA Chief Judicial Officer, reprinted in App to Pet
for Cert in No 90-1262 at 116a-117a.
"' Id at 97.
60 Id.
" EPA v Oklahoma, 908 F2d 595 (10th Cir 1990). See Arkansas, 503 US at 98
(describing the Tenth Circuit's decision as important and novel).
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of the standard, the court ruled that a permit allowing any additional discharge into such a degraded river constituted a per se
violation of the Oklahoma water quality standard. 2
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Tenth Circuit.' The Court indicated that it could have overturned the
decision on the grounds that neither the text of the CWA nor the
text of the Oklahoma standard supported the appellate court's
interpretation of the term "no degradation."6' Nevertheless, the
Court chose to reject the Tenth Circuit's holding "for a more
fundamental reason-namely, that the Court of Appeals exceeded
the legitimate scope of judicial review of an agency adjudication."'
The Court held that the EPA's decision to allow the
Fayetteville permit only on the condition that there be no "detectable violation" of the Oklahoma standard was a legitimate exercise of agency power requiring deference by the reviewing
court. The Court found that EPA regulations, consistent with the
general principles of the CWA, required all EPA-issued permits
to comply with the applicable water quality standards of affected
states." In doing so, the EPA regulation effectively "incorporate[d] into federal law those state-law standards the Agency
reasonably determined] to be 'applicable."' 7 Once incorporated,
the state standards became part of the federal law of water pollution control and, in accordance with Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v National Resources Defense Council," the "EPA's reasonable, consistently held interpretation of those standards [was] entitled to
substantial deference." 9 Consequently, because the EPA's interpretation of the Oklahoma standard was wholly reasonable
and consistent with the statute,70 the Court concluded that neither the Tenth Circuit nor the state of Oklahoma could substitute

62

503 US at 98.
Id.

Id at 109 ("[Tlhe Court of Appeals read [Oklahoma's] standards as containing the
same categorical ban on new discharges that the court had found in the [CWAI itself ....
[W]e do not believe the text of the Oklahoma standards supports the court's reading ....
").
Id.
503 US at 104-05 (referring to 40 CFR § 122.4(d) (1991), an EPA regulation that
requires NPDES permits to comply "with all applicable water quality requirements of all
affected states.").
67 Id at 110.
"
467 US 837 (1984).
6
503 US at 110.
70 Id at 111.
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their own interpretations of the standard, thus making the
Fayetteville permit valid.7 1
B. Arkansas v Oklahoma Narrows the Scope of the Preemption
Analysis of Past Interstate Water Pollution Decisions
InternationalPaper appears to hold that the CWA prohibits
the application of all state laws in the interstate water pollution
context.7 ' The CWA fully occupies the field of interstate water
pollution, imposing a carefully constructed balance of power between the source state, the down-stream state, and the EPA.7
The application of one state's law to discharges occurring in another state would disrupt the balance, and, therefore, should be
preempted.7 4
Arkansas, however, narrows significantly the scope of the
preemption doctrine announced in InternationalPaper. The Arkansas Court found the past preemption analysis inapplicable to
interstate water disputes arising out of the issuance of an
NPDES permit.7 5 Specifically, the preemption doctrine does not
prohibit the EPA from conditioning a permit issued in one state
on compliance with the water quality standards of a downstream
state.76
The Court justified this departure on the facts of the case.
According to the Court, InternationalPaper is inapplicable because it deals with a state-issued permit whereas Arkansas involves an EPA-issued permit.7 The distinction is significant because the EPA, by its own regulations, requires compliance with
water quality standards of affected states in all EPA-issued permits.78 The preemption doctrine is inappropriate because federal
law itself, in the form of an agency regulation, incorporates the
state standards into the body of federal water pollution law and
makes them applicable in the interstate context.79
'

Id at 112.

Indeed, the state of Arkansas argued before the Court that InternationalPaper had
fully resolved any questions about the status of a state water quality standard in the context of an interstate water pollution dispute. Brief of Petitioners, 1991 WL 521577, *17,
Arkansas, 503 US 91 ("Arkansas Brief).
Id at *17.
7' Id at *19.
7 503 US at 101.
'6 Id at 103.
7 Id at 101.
7' Id at 103. See note 64 and accompanying text.
503 US at 110. Thus, the Court also rejected a necessary corollary to Arkansas's
6'
argument: the EPA was prohibited from applying the water quality standards of one state
72
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However, the Court's concern with the relevant facts does
not fully explain its departure from the preemption analysis of
International Paper. The EPA offered a "fully sufficient alterna-

tive basis" for overturning the Tenth Circuit on traditional preemption grounds, a basis the Court chose to ignore." The EPA
acknowledged that its own regulations required all permits to
comply with the water quality standards of affected states."1
Nevertheless, it argued that it did not base its decision to grant
the Fayetteville permit upon an interpretation of the Oklahoma
standard. Rather, the EPA's decision to allow the Fayetteville
discharge absent a "detectable violation" of the Oklahoma stan-

dard was a threshold determination of whether, as a matter of
federal law, an issue of compliance existed in the first place. 2
The CWA provides that a permitting agency "shall condition such
license or permit in such a manner as may be necessary to insure

compliance with applicable water quality requirements."' The
ruling that the violation of a state standard must first be "detectable" was not an interpretation of the Oklahoma standard, but
rather an "intensely practical" determination that Oklahoma's
standard was not "applicable" for purposes of the CWA until the
violation was detectable." This threshold requirement was legit-

imate, even though it contradicted the plain meaning of the
Oklahoma standard,
because federal law preempts all supple5
law.
state
mentary
The Court did not address the EPA's argument despite the
fact that it offered a resolution consistent with prior interstate
water pollution cases.8 " By overlooking the EPA's argument, the

to a permit issued in another state. Arkansas Brief, 1991 WL 521577 at *11 (cited in note
72). Reserving the question of whether or not the CWA itself mandated compliance with
the water quality standards of an affected state, the Court found the EPA initiative to
account for such standards to be a permissible exercise of its authority. Arkansas, 503 US
at 105.
Thus, Arkansas leaves open two further questions: First, if it is reasonable for EPA
to require compliance with the water quality standards of affected states, is it reasonable
for the EPA to ignore the standards in issuing a permit in an upstream state? Second, as
Arkansas seems to suggest, does the preemption analysis of InternationalPapercontinue
to govern state-issued permits in the context of an interstate water pollution dispute?
80 Brieffor the EPA, 1991 WL 521580, *39 n 21, Arkansas, 503 US 91 ("EPA Brief').
'l
Id at *17-18.
82 Id at *18, *39 n 21.
33 USC § 1341(aX2).
EPA Brief, 1991 WL 521580 at *39 n 21 (cited in note 80).
InternationalPaper, 479 US at 494.
See Arkansas, 503 US at 110. The Court at first appeared to address this argument when it stated that the EPA regulation "effectively incorporates into federal law
those state-law standards the Agency reasonably determines to be 'applicable.' Id. How-
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Arkansas decision signals a concern with the traditional preemption doctrine that may be more fundamental than the narrow

concern for factual distinctions. Arguably, the Court may be
searching for an alternative to the traditional preemption analy-

sis applied to interstate water pollution disputes.
III. PAST PREEMPTION DECISIONS AND ARKANSAS V OKLAHOMA'S
HOLDING UNDER CHEVRON Do NOT HAVE THE SAME EFFECT
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v National Resources Defense Council87
holds that courts must give deference to an agency's reasonable

interpretation of an ambiguous statute that the agency implements." Contrary to the conclusion of many commentators, the
Supreme Court in Arkansas v Oklahoma intended the Chevron
doctrine to govern only the' relationship between the courts and
the EPA in interstate water disputes. The ruling was not intended to subordinate the states to the EPA in the same way as the
preemption analysis of past water pollution decisions did.
A. The Chevron Doctrine
Chevron involved a controversy over an EPA regulation that
defined an ambiguous term in the Clean Air Act. 9 The issue
before the Court was whether and to what extent a reviewing
court had to defer to an agency interpretation of a statute which
Congress had authorized the agency to implement.
The Chevron Court articulated a two-step process for determining when a court should defer to an agency interpretation.9

ever, the Court then went on to state:
[The EPA's Chief Judicial Officer] ruled that the Oklahoma standards--which
require that there be "no degradation" of the upper Illinois River-would only be
violated if the discharge effected an "actually detectable or measurable" change
in water quality. This interpretationof the Oklahoma standards is certainly
reasonable and consistent with the purposes and principles of the Clean Water
Act.
Id at 110-11 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Thus, the Court ignored the possibility
that the EPA ruling referred to the initial determination of which water quality standards
applied.
87 467 US 837 (1984).
Id at 843.
"
Id at 841-42.
'0 Id.
"' 467 US at 842-43. The Chevron two-step inquiry appears, on its face, to contradict
the explicit provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), which states: "To the
extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law [and] interpret constitutional and statutory provisions ... ." 5 USC
§706 (1994). While the exact nature of the relationship between Chevron and the APA was
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First, a reviewing court must determine whether Congress explicitly authorizes or forecloses the agency's interpretation.9 2 If
Congress's intent is clear, either in the statutory language, structure, or history, the reviewing court must follow Congress's intent.9" If, on the other hand, the statute is ambiguous, the only
appropriate inquiry for the reviewing court is whether the
agency's interpretation is "based on a permissible construction of
the statute. 94 At this point, the reviewing court may only examine whether the agency interpretation is reasonable. 5
The Chevron holding is deceptively simple.96 One author
has summarized it well: "Courts must defer to agency interpretations if and when Congress has told them to do so," and when the
statute is ambiguous, the presumption is that Congress intended
to delegate interpretive authority to the agency.97 The principle,
however, is question-begging. Chevron provides little guidance as
to which ambiguities are relevant, how much ambiguity is necessary to trigger judicial deference, and how broad the agency's
interpretive powers are once the court determines that Congress
delegated such powers.9 8 In order to make sense of Chevron, one
needs an underlying rationale or theory of deference."
In the aftermath of Chevron, commentators generally discern
three distinct theories of deference. The first is a theory based on
an assessment of comparative institutional advantage."w This
view characterizes Chevron as reflecting a belief that resolutions
of statutory ambiguity often require an inquiry into questions of
policy.1 ° ' Questions of policy, however, are best addressed by
agencies, because of their flexibility, expertise, and political ac-

not made explicit by the Court, it is certainly clear that the APA does not foreclose the
possibility of substantive statutes displacing the APA and granting law-interpreting
power to the agency. See Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90
Colum L Rev 2071, 2086 (1990).
92 467 US at 842.
Id at 842-43.
Id at 843.
'

Id.

See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 Yale L J
969, 980 (1992) ("[Jludicial understanding that informs the deference question is probably
more confused today than it has ever been.").
Sunstein, 90 Colum L Rev at 2084, 2086-88 (cited in note 91).
Id at 2091. See also Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98
Harv L Rev 505, 549-53 (1985).
99 Sunstein, 90 Colum L Rev at 2091 (cited in note 89). See also Antonin Scalia,
Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke L J 511, 516;
Kenneth W. Starr, JudicialReview in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 Yale J Reg 283, 300 (1986).
"o See, for example, Sunstein, 90 Colum L Rev at 2086 (cited in note 91).
1o1Id.
'
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countability.0 2 Thus, under the comparative advantage rationale, Chevron deference is proper only in instances where the
resolution of an ambiguity requires expert and deliberative

policymaking.
The second rationale relies on the separation of powers prin-

ciple: Chevron is a means of assuring that the courts serve primarily as a check against the abuse of agency power.'" Like
the notion of comparative institutional advantage, the separation
of powers rationale also begins with the premise that the resolution of ambiguities in statutory law often involves policy questions. 5 Here, however, deference to agency interpretation is
proper, not because an agency is better suited to making policy
decisions, but because the principle of separation of powers demands that courts not interfere with the policymaking powers of
a coordinate branch of the government.0 6 Reviewing courts may

legitimately interfere with an agency decision only when compelling evidence of error or arbitrariness is present. 7
"02Id at 2087, 2096-97. The notion that Chevron promotes expert policy making with
democratic accountability also finds resonance in the separation of powers rationale
advocated by Kenneth Starr and others. See notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
103 Chevron recognizes this theory: "[T]he [EPA's] interpretation represents a reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing interests and is entitled to deference: the
regulatory scheme is technical and complex, the agency considered the matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion, and the decision involves reconciling conflicting policies." 467
US at 865 (footnotes omitted). See also Massachusetts v Morash, 490 US 107, 116 (1989)
(deference given to an agency interpretation of technical terms). On the other hand, courts
should not defer to agency interpretation when the comparative institutional advantage of
agencies over courts is not so apparent. See, for example, Bowen v Georgetown University
Hospital, 488 US 204, 212 (1988) ("Ve have never applied [Chevron] to agency litigating
positions that are wholly unsupported by regulations, rulings, or administrative practice."); Securities IndustriesAssn v Board of Governors of the FederalReserve System, 468
US 137, 143 (1984) ("[P]ost hoc rationalizations by counsel for agency action are entitled
to little deference."); United States v Western Electric Co., 900 F2d 283, 297 (DC Cir 1990)
(applying lesser standard of deference to interpretation of Justice Department in civil or
criminal case); Kelley v EPA, 15 F3d 1100, 1108 (DC Cir 1994) ("Where Congress ... gives
the agency authority only to bring the question to a federal court as the 'prosecutor,'
deference to the agency's interpretation is inappropriate.").
"04See, for example, Starr, 3 Yale J Reg at 300-01 (cited in note 99) ("... Chevron
strongly suggests that courts should see themselves not as supervisors of agencies, but
more as a check or bulwark against abuses of agency power.").
1" Id at 294-95 (" . . . a statute often represents a compromise or accommodation be-

tween two or more conflicting policies.").
60 Id at 307-12.

Independent Bankers Assn v Marine Midland Bank, 757 F2d 453, 461 (2d Cir
1985). See also Texas v United States, 756 F2d 419, 421 (5th Cir 1985) (agency interpretation deserved deference even where the interpretation of the court was perhaps more in
line with legislative intent); Missouri Public Service Commission v ICC, 763 F2d 1014,
1017 (8th Cir 1985) (only inquiry for the court is whether agency interpretation was
sufficiently reasonable); Sudomir v McMahon, 767 F2d 1456, 1459 (9th Cir 1985) (reason107
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The third theory views Chevron as a bright-line default rule
of statutory interpretation.1 8 Under this rationale, courts presume that any statutory ambiguity indicates congressional intent
to leave the matter to the implementing agency. The courts' presumption creates a clear rule against which Congress can legislate.'0 9 Congress is on notice that courts will interpret ambiguity as a delegation of interpretive powers to relevant agencies.
This rationale justifies a very broad reading of Chevron, making

irrelevant any concerns about which branch should resolve which
ambiguities."0 The only necessary criterion for triggering judicial deference is the identification of a clear ambiguity in the statute."'
B. Arkansas v Oklahoma's Chevron Holding Governs Only the

Relationship between the EPA and the Courts, Not the
Relationship between the EPA and the States
Chevron explicitly governs only the relationship between

federal agencies and the courts." 2 The rationales that underlie
the doctrine explain when and why interpretive actions of federal
agencies deserve deference from reviewing courts. They do not
implicate the division of power between states and federal agen-

able construction by an implementing agency should not be struck down merely because
the court prefers another); Callaway v Block, 763 F2d 1283, 1288 (11th Cir 1985) (agency
interpretation entitled to deference absent compelling signs that it was wrong).
108 Scalia, 1989 Duke L J at 517 (cited in note 99).
109 Justice Scalia has written:
In the vast majority of cases I expect that Congress neither (1) intended a single
result, nor (2) meant to confer discretion upon the agency, but rather (3) didn't
think about the matter at all. If I am correct in that, then any rule adopted in
this field represents merely a fictional, presumed intent, and operates principally as a background rule of law against which Congress can legislate. If that is
the principal function to be served, Chevron is unquestionably better than what
preceded it. Congress now knows that the ambiguities it creates... will be
resolved, within the bounds of permissible interpretation, not by the courts but
by a particular agency, whose policy biases will ordinarily be known. The legislative process becomes less of a sporting event when those supporting and opposing a particular disposition do not have to gamble upon whether.., the
ultimate answer will be provided by the courts or rather by [an agency].
Id.
110 Id at 517-21.
.. Thus, Scalia dispenses with considering both whether an agency interpretation is a
consistent and longstanding one, Id at 517, and the manner and context in which the
agency arrived at its interpretation. Id at 519.
..
2 Chevron settled the specific conflict between the belief that only the courts "declared what the law is" and the need for flexible, rulemaking bodies to administer the increasingly complex and unspecifiable regulations of the modern legislative era. See
Sunstein, 90 Colum L Rev at 2078-85 (cited in note 89).
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cies in interpreting state laws subject to agency approval. Some
commentators, however, suggest that Arkansas's Chevron holding
has implications for the EPA-state relationship as well.11 Many
assume that if the reviewing court must grant deference to an
EPA interpretation of a state water quality standard, then the

state that promulgated the standard must also defer to the EPA
interpretation.11 '
Arkansas's Chevron analysis, however, does not address the

relative authority of the EPA and states in interpreting the state
water quality standards. The commentators assume that the
Arkansas Court faced the following two questions: (1) Who, between the court and the EPA, has the primary responsibility to
interpret the state standards; and (2) who, between the EPA and
the state, has the primary responsibility for interpreting the
state standards? 5 The Arkansas Court, however, never faced
the second question because the state of Oklahoma did not disagree with the EPA's interpretation of its water quality
standards." 6 Because the Court did not face a conflict between
the EPA and a state, Arkansas's Chevron holding cannot be understood to resolve the issue of the EPA-state relationship in

interpreting the state water quality standards.

113 See, for example, Note, The Ever-Changing Balance of Power in Interstate Water
Pollution:Do Affected States Have Anything to Say after Arkansas v. Oklahoma?, 50 Wash
& Lee L Rev 1341, 1343 (1993) (Arkansas's holding that the lower court must defer to
EPA's interpretation is read to mean that the EPA was granted power to "interpret a
state's water quality standards even though such interpretation is inconsistent with the
state's own determination.').
114 See, for example, Note, The Impact of Arkansas v. Oklahoma on the NPDES
Process under the Clean Water Act, 23 Envir L 273, 291 (1993) (concluding that Arkansas
subordinates affected downstream states to the EPA); Note, Arkansas v. Oklahoma:
Downstream States Left Without a Paddle, 9 J Nat Resources & Envir L 189 (1994) ("The
importance of [Arkansas] lies in the Supreme Court's determination of the hierarchy of
the various states and federal interests involved in water quality disputes"); Comment,
The States Square Off in Arkansas v. Oklahoma-and the Winner Is... the EPA, 70 Deny
U L 557, 565 (1993) (Arkansas suggests that the EPA is free to ignore, in its incorporation
of a state standard, any underlying concerns that the state had in implementing the
standards in the first place); Note, 50 Wash & Lee L Rev at 1343 (cited in note 111)
(Arkansas granted the EPA power to interpret a state's water quality standards even
though such an interpretation is inconsistent with the state's own determination, thus
leaving the affected state with little, if any, say in the interstate water pollution conflict.).
"5 See note 114.
116 Arkansas, 503 US at 109. Oklahoma and the EPA only disputed
the factual issue
of whether or not the Fayetteville facility will affect a "detectable violation" of the standard. Disagreement over a factual determination is not governed by Chevron but rather
by the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 USC § 551 et seq (1994). Oklahoma did, however,
adopt the Tenth Circuit's interpretation for purposes of arguing before the Supreme
Court. Brief of Respondents, 1991 WL 521581, *16, Arkansas, 503 US 91.
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Furthermore, if the Court intended the Chevron rationale to
address the EPA-state relationship, then Arkansas would represent an unprecedented expansion of the Chevron doctrine. Although expansions and retreats in the Court's understanding of
the Chevron doctrine are not unusual,'17 Arkansas presents an
unlikely candidate for an important Chevron decision. The quiet
unanimity of the opinion supports the belief that Arkansas's
Chevron holding is nothing more than a routine decision about
the relationship between the court and a federal agency.
IV. ARKANSAS V OKLAHOMA RESTORES COOPERATIVE

FEDERALISM INTENDED BY THE CLEAN WATER ACT
The Clean Water Act promotes cooperative federalism. Under
the CWA, states and the federal government work together as
partners in implementing and enforcing water quality standards." 8' The preemption analysis of past water pollution decisions threatened to effectively deny partnership status to the
states." 9' Arkansas v Oklahoma, however, offers the EPA and
states an opportunity to restore the proper balance of power
between them.
A. The Clean Water Act Is a Model of Cooperative Federalism
Congress intended the CWA to be a model of cooperative
federalism."2 Cooperative federalism is intended to preserve
state autonomy and responsibility, while providing a level of
uniformity through nationally mandated minimum standards. 2 ' Studies indicate that the accommodation of some measure of state autonomy with federal supervision results in better

117 See, for example, Merrill, 101 Yale L J at 985 (cited in note 96) (discussing the
sudden rise and fall of the rule announced in INS v Cardoza-Fonseca,480 US 421 (1987),
that no deference would be given to an agency ruling that involved "pure issues of law").
11 33 USC § 1251 et seq (1994)
"9 See part IV.B.
120 See 33 USC § 1251(b) ("It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve,
and
protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate
pollution.... ."). See also InternationalPaper Co. v Ouellette, 479 US 481, 489-90 (1987)
("The amendments... recognize[d] that the States should have a significant role in protecting their own natural resources .... The CWA... establishes a regulatory
'partnership' between the Federal Government and the source State."); Robert V. Percival,
Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 Md L Rev
1141, 1174 (1995) (cooperative federalism is the "predominant approach to environmental
federalism").
'21
Percival, 54 Md L Rev at 1174-75 (cited in note 120). See also John P. Dwyer, The
Practiceof Federalism under the Clean Air Act, 54 Md L Rev 1183, 1190 (1995).
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environmental policies and better enforcement of those policies."
Typically, a statute based on the model of cooperative federalism authorizes federal agencies to set minimum national standards and makes states responsible for implementing those stan-

dards." A federal agency maintains supervisory authority, but
states have the primary responsibility to administer and enforce
the statute within their borders.1" Furthermore, states typically have the authority to implement more stringent standards
than the national standards."2 The ability to set more stringent
standards, coupled with the ability to take part in the actual

administration of the program, provide important freedom for
states to tailor general environmental policies to their specific
circumstances, needs, and goals."2
Within the CWA, the elements of cooperative federalism are
easy to identify.'2 7 The key to the cooperative federalism structure of the CWA is the Savings Clause." The Savings Clause
guarantees states the authority to set their own water quality

standards as long as they do not fall below the minimum standards set by the EPA."2 Consistent with the cooperative feder-

alism goals of the CWA, the Savings Clause allows states to
tailor water quality standards to fit their particular circumstances and long-term goals, thereby providing a greater incentive to cooperate and participate in the administration of the CWA."3 °

See Percival, 54 Md L Rev at 1174-75 (cited in note 120) (cooperative federalism
models successfully take advantage of the expertise, information, and political support of
state officials necessary to make environmental policies work). See also Dwyer, 54 Md L
Rev at 1224 (cited in note 121) (the autonomy afforded to states by cooperative federalism
also fosters greater enthusiasm and willingness to experiment with new policies).
'" Aside from the CWA, the Clean Air Act, 42 USC § 7401 et seq (1994), and the Safe
Drinking Water Act, 42 USC § 300f et seq (1994), are also premised on the cooperative
federalism model. See Percival, 54 Md L Rev at 1174 (cited in note 120).
24 Percival, 54 Md L Rev at 1175 (cited in note 120).
126

Id.
Id.

327

See discussion in Part L.A about the structure of the CWA.

122

33 USC § 1370. See Part IV.A.
Id. See also Illinois v Milwaukee, 731 F2d 403, 413 (7th Cir 1984) (holding that
Savings Clause expressly preserves a State's right to adopt and enforce rules that are
more stringent than federal standards).
"0 See note 122.
'
'
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the

The traditional preemption analysis, relied upon in Milwaukee v Illinois' and International Paper Co. v Ouellette, 2
jeopardizes the cooperative federalism of the CWA. Specifically,
the preemption analysis threatens to unnecessarily constrain the

scope of the Savings Clause. Milwaukee suggests, and International Paper confirms, that the Savings Clause authorizes a state
to impose more stringent limitations only on pollution originating
within the state." In interstate water pollution disputes, the
CWA preempts all state laws, including state water quality standards."3
For many states that share waterways with other states,
preempting the Savings Clause for purposes of interstate water
pollution disputes renders their water quality laws ineffective.
The state of Oklahoma may choose to set higher standards for
waters within its borders, but without any means of controlling
the discharges flowing from states with lower standards, it cannot maintain its desired standard of water quality.13 Other provisions of the CWA provide some safeguards for states desiring to
maintain a higher level of water quality. Before the EPA or an
approved state issues a permit, both must notify all affected

states and grant them an opportunity to voice their objections in
an administrative hearing.'

131

451 US 304 (1981).

112

479 US 481 (1987).

'" Milwaukee, 451 US at 328 ("...

If the EPA or the permit-issuing

States may adopt more stringent limitations
through state administrative processes.., and apply them to in-state dischargers.");
International Paper, 479 US at 493 ("[The Savings Clause] arguably limits the effect of
the clause to discharges flowing directly into a State's own waters, i.e. discharges from
within the State. The savings clause, then, does not preclude pre-emption of the law of an
affected State.").
134 International Paper,479 US at 494 ("Because we do not believe Congress intended
to undermine this carefully drawn statute through a general savings clause, we conclude
that the CWA precludes a court from applying the law of an affected State against an outof-state source." (citations omitted)).
"15An upstream state may argue that downstream states such as Oklahoma, in
setting its water quality standards, should account for the possibility of discharges from
states with lower standards and adjust their standards accordingly. The argument,
however, would require setting greater limitations on discharges from within the state
than would be necessary for the same water quality level if Oklahoma did not take into
account the out-of-state discharges. The higher standard would likely cause greater
burdens on industry and business than Oklahoma felt was appropriate when it first
formulated its policy. Thus, the state would have to forego its desired level of water
quality.
'36 33 USC §§ 1341(aX2), 1342(bX3).
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state rejects the recommendations of the affected state, both
must inform the affected states of the reasons for denial. 37 However, as the InternationalPaper Court made clear, the affected
states "occupy a subordinate position" in the federal regulatory
program. 1" Procedural safeguards do not guarantee that the
permit-issuing authority will consider the higher water quality
standards of an affected state. 3 ' Under the preemption framework of InternationalPaper, the vitality of the Savings Clause
and, consequently, the principle of cooperative federalism upon
which the CWA was modeled, depend upon the willingness of
upstream states to give sufficient weight to downstream concerns.
C. Arkansas v Oklahoma's Rejection of the Traditional
Preemption Analysis and Adoption of the Chevron Framework
Promotes Cooperative Federalism
The Arkansas v Oklahoma decision holds hope for the restoration of cooperative federalism under the CWA. While affirming
the primacy of federal law and the federal agency in the context
of interstate water pollution disputes,"4 Arkansas does not at
the same time jeopardize CWA's structure of cooperative federalism. The decision allows the EPA and the states to strike the
proper balance between the federal interest in minimizing interstate conflict and the states' interest in maintaining a desired
level of water quality by encouraging cooperation between the
states and the EPA.
Arkansas promotes cooperative federalism of the CWA by
avoiding the debilitating implications of Milwaukee and International Paper for the Savings Clause. By limiting the scope of the
preemption analysis and rendering it inapplicable to the implementation of state water quality standards,"" Arkansas provides a means by which downstream water quality standards can
be enforced against upstream states. Arkansas thus gives effect
to the Savings Clause guarantee that states will be free to implement and enforce higher water quality standards.

13733

USC § 1342(bX5).

479 US at 491.
Furthermore, the CWA does not guarantee that an affected state will even be
granted a hearing. See Costle v PacificLegal Foundation,445 US 198, 220 (1980) (upholding EPA regulation that limited public hearings for extending NPDES permits).
'3'

'"'

"o 503 US at 110.

...Id at 107.
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Furthermore, Arkansas's Chevron holding facilitates a
unique dynamic between the states and the EPA by giving greater incentives to both parties to cooperate and share regulatory
power. Under Arkansas and Chevron, the EPA retains final authority for interpreting and applying state water quality standards in the interstate context. 42 The EPA's authority will assure that the resolution of interstate water pollution conflicts will
be consistent with the overall dictates of the CWA.
However, judicial deference to the EPA's interpretation is
conditioned on the interpretation being "permissible"." The Arkansas Court did not have the opportunity to address the issue of
what sort of interpretation by the EPA of a state water quality
standard would satisfy the "permissible" standard.'" Prior to
Arkansas, a decision in the Sixth Circuit addressed a similar
question in the context of the Clean Air Act ("CAA").'" The
CAA, like the CWA, authorizes states to enact individual State
Implementation Plans ("SIPs") for the enforcement of national
standards as long as they meet federal guidelines. 14 Like the
state water quality standards, the EPA interpretation of the SIPs
also require deference from the reviewing court. 47 To warrant
deference, however, the interpretation must be consistent with
the language, intent and understanding of the state SIP drafters. 14 Thus, caselaw suggests that the EPA's discretion is limited when interpreting state regulations. Specifically, the agency
must be as faithful as possible to a state's original understanding
when applying the standard in the interstate context.
Knowing that it will be bound, more or less, 149 to the original understanding of the state standard, the EPA has a powerful
incentive to clarify, at the approval stage, the meaning of a
state's standard. 50 Forced to look toward long-term regional imId at 110.
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v NaturalResources Defense Council, 467 US 837, 843 (1984).
In assessing whether an interpretation of a state standard by the EPA is reasonable, courts must inquire as to whether the language, structure, and legislative history of
the state standard matter, and whether prior interpretations by state officials also matter. The Arkansas Court did not examine the issue fully because the state of Oklahoma
did not challenge the interpretation of its water quality standard when the Arkansas
permit was issued. 503 US at 109.
Navistar InternationalTransportationCorp. v EPA, 858 F2d 282 (6th Cir 1988).
14 Id at 284.
' Id at 286.
142
"

"

Id at 287-88.

9 "More or less," because the interpretation and application of a state standard in
the interstate context must also comply with the general dictates of the CWA. See Arkansas, 503 US at 111.
" The EPA must approve a state water quality standard before the state may imple-
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plications, the EPA will find it advantageous to negotiate with
states to achieve water quality standards that avoid undue impact on other states.
The states, likewise, will likely cooperate and seek agreement on the meaning of their water quality standards. First,
states will wish to avoid the issuance of standards by the EPA in
the event of an impasse between themselves and the regulators.15 1 Second, because a definitive interpretation of a statute
insures predictability and consistency in future interpretations
and applications by the EPA, states will realize that they stand
to benefit from cooperating with the EPA. Thus, the dynamic
that Arkansas's Chevron holding sets into motion promotes collaboration between the state and the EPA with a view toward
the long-term accord, resulting in a fairer and more rational
water pollution policy.
CONCLUSION

Arkansas's narrowing of the scope of previous preemption
decisions, together with its Chevron holding, restores the proper
balance between federal and state interests under the Clean
Water Act. On the one hand, the Savings Clause and, consequently, the ability of states to control the quality of their own
waters, is strengthened through the ability of the EPA to enforce
individual water quality standards in the interstate context. On
the other hand, the EPA maintains the final authority to enforce
such water quality standards in accordance with the overall purpose and structure of the CWA.
More importantly, Arkansas gives states and the EPA incentives to come to a shared understanding of the meaning and
implementation of the standard in both intrastate and interstate
contexts. The scheme will facilitate the formation of a rational
regional policy that takes into consideration individual state concerns as well as regional concerns, minimizing subsequent conflicts. Arkansas, in breaking from the long tradition of minimizing state authority in this area, represents a renewed commitment by the Court to take the notion of state sovereignty serious-

ment it. 33 USC § 1313(a). Furthermore, the CWA requires that a state periodically
review and revise its standards and submit changes for all EPA approval. 33 USC
§ 1313(c). If the state does not implement water quality standards in compliance with the
CWA, the EPA may implement standards for the state. 33 USC § 1313(a).
"' See note 143.
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ly and marks the ascendancy of cooperative federalism as a doctrinally viable alternative to the modern regulatory state.

